Re: Glória update

On 07/09/2025 07:53, owen brison wrote:

 

A "Nota Informativa" was published this evening by GPIAAF, the local body charged with investigating accidents in the air or on rails. This pdf is downloadable from the GPIAAF site but I'm attaching it. The Nota just describes what happened and will later be followed by a Preliminary and then a Final Report. The GPIAAF does not attribute blame. 

 

Here's how Google Translate interprets the key text:

M40021-C R01 / GPIAAF-2019-06-20 Information Note 1/7
INFORMATION NOTE RESEARCH OPENING RAIL TRANSPORTATION
GPIAAF PROCESS F_Inv20250903

Summary description: Derailment and subsequent collision of the Glória elevator cabins, following the disconnection of the cable between the cabins

1. THE SYSTEM AND ITS OPERATION

The elevator installed on Calçada da Glória, classified as a national monument, in its typology and Its current configuration dates back to 1914, although over the past 111 years it has undergone several conservation and improvement interventions, in addition to periodic maintenance as defined by each stage. Since 1926, its operation has been handled by the Companhia Carris de Ferro de Lisboa.

It has a 276-meter track and overcomes a 45-meter drop, with an average gradient of 18%. Its maximum operating speed is 3.2 m/s (11.5 km/h), taking just over a minute to complete.
It consists of two vehicles, called "cabins" and numbered 1 and 2, each with a tare weight of approximately 14 tons and capacity for 42 people, 22 seated and the rest standing, plus the driver (known as the "brakeman"). Each cabin consists of a metal bed to which a box is fixed, made of wooden uprights and crossbeams, also covered with wood and thin sheet metal, according to the classic construction style at the time of its entry into service.

The cabins are connected by a cable, which balances the weight of both through a large-diameter flywheel located at the top of Calçada da Glória in an underground technical compartment.

Unlike the most common system used in funiculars, this flywheel is not motorized to activate the movement of the cable and thus move the cabins; it is instead the type referred to in the literature as a self-propelled funicular. Thus, each of the two cabins is equipped with two 18 kW electric motors, which, through the wheels and their adhesion to the rails, provide the necessary tractor force to overcome the internal forces resisting movement and those resulting from the weight difference between the vehicles corresponding to their respective passenger loads. 

The system's four motors (two in each vehicle) are all electrically connected in series through overhead conductors to which the two cabs are connected, so that the two cabs and the connecting cable only start when the control system in each vehicle is maneuvered to the traction position by the respective brakeman.

The connecting cable between the two cabs runs underground, guided by pulleys in a trench whose opening to the sidewalk is delimited by "Z"-shaped steel profiles. This cable is attached to the bed of each cab (known as a "truck") by a special trolley ("trambolho"), which extends from the truck into the trench and to which the cable is attached using a special process. 

There are two trambolhos in each vehicle, connected by another cable independent of the connecting cable between the two cabs. 

Each trampoline also incorporates four movable shoes (therefore eight shoes per vehicle), moved by a pneumatically actuated lever system against each flange of the aforementioned Z-profiles, which constitutes the vehicles' main braking system, whether for service or emergency use. 

The vehicles also have a manual brake system that actuates a friction block on each wheel.

The elevator system, as designed, is designed to, in the event of failure of the cable connection between the cabins:

➢ Automatically apply the pneumatic brake to each vehicle at maximum force, through an internal mechanism activated by the loss of cable strength in the trampoline; 

➢ Cut power to the vehicles' electrical system through a device located in the technical compartment at the top of Calçada da Glória and incorporated into the cable reversal flywheel support, which detects the absence of the load transmitted by the connection cable; the absence of electrical power in the system also automatically applies the pneumatic brake to each vehicle at maximum force. 

2. THE EVENTS OF THE ACCIDENT

At 6:00 PM on September 3, the Glória funicular had its cabins parked at both stations—no. 1 at the top of Calçada da Glória and no. 2 below, near Praça dos Restauradores—receiving passengers. 

At this point in the investigation, the exact number of passengers in each vehicle has not yet been determined, and brakemen are controlling capacity according to the maximum permitted capacity. 

At approximately 6:03 PM, after normal coordination procedures between the respective brakemen, the cabins begin their journey.

A few moments after the movement begins, and when they have traveled no more than about six meters, the cabins suddenly lose the balance provided by the connecting cable connecting them. 

Cabin No. 2 suddenly reverses, its movement halted approximately 10 meters later by its partial exit beyond the end of the railway and the burying of the underside of the cable trench.

Cabin No. 1, at the top of Calçada da Glória, continues its downward movement, increasing its speed. 

The vehicle's brakeman immediately applies the air brake and the hand brake to try to halt the movement. 

These actions have no effect on sustaining or reducing the vehicle's speed, and the cabin continues accelerating down the slope. 

Approximately 170 meters after the beginning of its route, at the beginning of the right-hand curve that the Calçada alignment presents in its final part, the vehicle, due to its speed, derails and begins to roll to the left in the direction of travel, in which it is partially supported by the fitting of the trampolines in the Z profiles. 

However, the forces developed end up tearing the Z profiles from the pavement and the vehicle completely loses its guidance, colliding laterally with the upper part of the cabin against the wall of the building on the left side of the Calçada, which began the destruction of the wooden box and then frontally against a streetlight pole and another supporting the elevator's overhead electrical network, both made of cast iron and which caused very significant damage to the box, and shortly thereafter ending its uncontrolled movement against the corner of another building. It is estimated, with a non-negligible margin of uncertainty due to the lack of knowledge of some parameters, that the first impact occurred at a speed of around 60 km/h, with all these events having occurred in a time of less than 50 seconds.

The violent collision was immediately witnessed by bystanders and law enforcement officers present.

Emergency services were quickly called, and a significant rescue device was immediately activated to assist the injured, with emergency medical services arriving at the scene a few minutes later.

The accident resulted in 15 fatal injuries, five serious injuries, and 13 minor injuries, some of whom were not occupants of the vehicles.

3. INITIAL FINDINGS

An on-site study of the wreckage revealed that the cable connecting the two cabins had given way at its attachment point inside the upper truss of cabin No. 1 (the one that began its journey at the top of
Calçada da Glória). 

The remaining cable, the reverse flywheel, and the pulleys where it runs were found to be lubricated and without apparent anomalies. 

The cable on the upper beam of cabin no. 2 was also found to have no apparent anomalies.

The cable used is type 6x36SW-CF U 1960 ZZ L3 CRM, consisting of six strands of 36 steel wires with a fiber core, with a total nominal diameter of 32 mm and an approximate breaking load of 662 kN (approximately 68 tons). 

This type of cable has been used in this elevator for approximately six years.

It has a fixed useful life of 600 days for this purpose, and the one in place at the time of the accident had been installed 337 days earlier, with a remaining useful life of 263 days until replacement. 

The system operator considers the defined useful life of the cable to have a significant safety factor.

The maintenance and upkeep of the Glória elevator system is contracted by the operator to a specialized third-party service provider. 

The terms of the existing contract stipulate that the former is responsible for supplying the cables and the latter for installing them under the supervision of the former.

The elevator is subject to a maintenance plan to be followed by the respective service provider, which provides for varying levels of intervention with different frequency according to the scope and extent of the interventions. 

These range from major overhauls every four years to routine daily visual inspections of visible safety elements, with various other inspections and interventions performed at intervals in between. 

According to the evidence observed so far, the scheduled maintenance plan was up to date, and a scheduled visual inspection had been conducted on the morning of the accident, which detected no anomalies in the cable or the vehicles' braking systems. 

The area where the cable separated cannot be seen without disassembly.

The evidence confirms that the emergency system installed in the reverse steering wheel located at the top of Calçada da Glória, which cuts power to the cabs in the event of a loss of cable power, worked as intended, resulting in the immediate and automatic application of the air brakes in each cab.

At this time, it has not yet been possible to conduct verification checks to confirm whether the system that automatically applies the air brakes to the vehicles as a result of the loss of cable power on the truck was working. 

However, and regardless of this, evidence indicates that the pneumatic brake and the manual brake were quickly applied by the brakeman of cabin #1, but that in the current configuration, the brakes lack sufficient capacity to stop the cabins in motion without their empty masses being mutually balanced by the connecting cable. 

Therefore, it does not constitute a redundant system in the event of this connection failure.

To date, the investigation has found that the elevator is not under the supervision of the Institute of Mobility and Transport, I.P., and the investigation currently does not have reliable and confirmed information regarding the legal framework of the Glória elevator or which public entity is responsible for supervising the operation and safety of this public transportation system, beyond the intervention of an accredited entity that, at the initiative of the operating company, inspects the equipment during major repairs every four years.

4. ABOUT THE RESEARCH

GPIAAF was notified of the accident 50 minutes after it occurred, via a phone call from the National Emergency and Civil Protection Authority.

Given the accident's characteristics and consequences, it was immediately determined to be a serious accident, as defined by Decree-Law No. 394/2007, which requires the initiation of a formal safety investigation process, pursuant to Article 4, § 1, of the aforementioned Decree-Law.

A two-person team from GPIAAF began collecting evidence at the scene around 8:30 a.m. the following day, in collaboration with the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Judicial Police, the Public Security Police, the Working Conditions Authority, and with the cooperation of Carris and the maintenance service provider.

After the initial findings and recording of the evidence at the scene, the wreckage of cabin no.

Most of the physical and documentary evidence is in the custody of the Public Prosecutor's Office, with GPIAAF having access for its investigation, as stated in the aforementioned Decree-Law.

It should be clear that both investigations are completely independent and have distinct purposes. However, given the need to share physical evidence, all forensic examinations and other tests are being prepared in close coordination between both entities.

All other entities involved, namely Carris and the maintenance service provider, have demonstrated the utmost cooperation with the GPIAAF investigation. 

Among other aspects, the GPIAAF investigation will focus on the following:

• Disconnection mechanism between the cable and the hoist, with analysis of the condition of the cable attachment to the hoists and its implementation;
• Initial elevator design, its subsequent modifications, and safety system assumptions;
• Verification of the operation of the braking systems, their composition, and effectiveness;
• Definition of the type of cable and its attachment to the hoists, quality controls for execution and reception;
• Maintenance procedures for safety-critical components and their implementation and verification;
• Conditions and feasibility of carrying out inspection and maintenance operations;
• Training, experience, and proficiency of technicians involved in maintenance operations;
• Supervision of the execution of the services provided by the contracting party, including means and frequency;
• Service provider selection criteria;
• Training, instruction, and proficiency of operating personnel to handle emergency situations;
• Survival aspects;
• Legal framework for the Glória elevator and its supervision;
• Development of rescue operations.

The investigation will continue through various expert assessments to the components, document analysis, and interviews with relevant individuals.

The GPIAAF will publish a preliminary report, expectedly within 45 days, detailing the investigation work carried out and the conclusions available at that time, taking into account any restrictions arising from the obligations of judicial secrecy in the ongoing parallel legal proceedings.

After the investigation and the hearing of the relevant parties are completed, the GPIAAF will publish the final report containing the established facts, their analysis, the conclusions on the causes of the accident, and, if applicable, safety recommendations. 

If it is not possible to publish the final report within one year, in accordance with national and European legislation, the GPIAAF will publish an interim report at that time, describing the progress of the investigation and any safety issues detected to date.

However, if it detects, at any stage of the investigation, any aspect that it believes may pose an immediate, uncontrolled potential safety risk, the GPIAAF will immediately issue an urgent safety alert to the relevant entities so they can take the appropriate measures.

End